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INDIVIDUALISM IN THE AGE 
OF INTERNATIONALISM 
Alyson Cole* 
THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF 
INDIVIDUALISM. By Thomas M . . Franck. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 1999. Pp. xiii, 312. Cloth, $ 45. 
In the brief conclusion to The Empowered Self" Law and Society in 
the Age of Individualism, Thomas M. Franck asserts that he cannot 
satisfactorily summarize his book's argument. Even if it were achiev­
able, he clarifies, he would not engage in such an endeavor, since it 
would "preempt the reader's autonomy and subvert his or her individ­
ual rights" (p. 278). That the author himself rejects the desirability of 
doing what reviewers generally do (i.e., condense and inevitably sim­
plify complex tomes) is perhaps a somewhat awkward way to com­
mence a discussion of his book. Nevertheless, this comment illustrates 
the extent to which Franck champions individual liberties and rights. It 
is also indicative of the declaratory tone of his prose: Franck reports 
observing "signs of tectonic change" (p. 278), indicating that we have 
reached "truly an historic watershed" (p. 195) of a "glorious self­
invented future" (p. 45), or, as he puts it elsewhere, the "new dawning 
of a spirit of individual assertiveness" (p. 60). Ironically, while he 
seems to encourage diverse readings, his text, for the most part, relies 
on a rhetoric of inevitability, leaving the reader little room for alterna­
tive views. 
Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International 
Studies at New York University, Franck has earned a distinguished 
reputation in the field of internat.ional law. In this new study, he 
adopts quite an ambitious framework that, beyond legal matters, cov­
ers a vast terrain, from the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the 
"new economy,'' to the history of the state over the last 300 years and 
fundamental disagreements in political theory. His argument about 
the global ascendance of individualism progresses through an explora­
tion of the changing balance of power among a trinity of "rights claim­
ants" - the state, the individual, and the group - as measured by 
their respective capacity to determine personal identities. This, in turn, 
is gauged largely, but not exclusively, through the construction and 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A., Smith; M.A., 
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application of international and national laws. The increasing power of 
individuals to be masters of their own identities comes at the expense 
of the other two vertexes of the triad - states and groups. Global de­
velopments in economics, communications, and urbanization have also 
facilitated a new elasticity of personal identity. But most conducive to 
"the age of individualism" has been the eroding of the eighteenth cen­
tury Vattelian structure,1 which conceived of the world as comprised 
of well-defined, solitary states, and of universal well-being as resting 
upon states' uninfringeable sovereignty. Franck sincerely hopes that 
his work will advance this process. 
The Empowered Self is not solely for the specialist; its audience 
will likely include many beyond the field of law. Overall, it is a lucid, 
comprehensive, and timely analysis. It successfully draws from a re­
markably wide array of materials to build a coherent synthesis. 
Franck's juridical focus endows discussions of identity-formation -
which frequently slip towards the speculative and the ephemeral -
with a concreteness that is refreshing, if not always entirely convinc­
ing. Moreover, the global reach of the comparativist approach brings 
new perspectives to persistent debates over identity politics in North 
America. The portrayal of the new international jurisprudence is per­
haps the book's greatest contribution. Unlike the former global system 
that hinged on (and enhanced) the autonomy of states, the new ar­
rangements are linked with the rights and freedoms of individuals. 
Franck reveals an aspect of internationalism that has been overshad­
owed by other, much hyped, elements in the new world order, such as 
the burgeoning market economy and the distance-shrinking effects of 
the Internet. These, as well as the accelerated process of democratiza­
tion wGrldwide, are related to, and yet distinct from, the phenomenon 
described in The Empowered Self Franck's assessment is especially 
important today when the prospects of internationalism raise fears and 
anxieties across the American political spectrum. Unfortunately, he 
takes a fine point too far by interjecting into the work a celebratory, 
millennial discourse and indulging in an excessively optimistic futur­
ology. 
1. EMER DE v A ITEL, THE LA w OF NATIONS 1 (Luke White trans., 1792) (1758). Franck 
rightly characterizes Vattel as John Locke's transnational cousin, for Vattel argued: 
(N)ations or states are political bodies, societies of men united together to procure 
their mutual safety and advantage by means of their union. 
Such as society has its affairs and interest, it deliberates and takes resolutions in com­
mon, and thus becomes a moral person, having an understanding and a will peculiar to itself, 
and is susceptible of obligations and laws. 
Id. The Vattelian model acknowledged neither group nor individual rights. Efforts to protect 
minorities in the aftermath of World War I served as the foundation for international recog­
nition of groups' rights, eventually emboldening secessionist groups. This asymmetry in the 
triad would only be addressed after the Second World War, when the individual was seen as 
needing protection by international laws. 
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The old order imposed rigid identities on individuals, mainly be­
cause states demanded exclusive loyalty from their citizens. Hostility 
toward the Other was also constitutive of certain identity configura­
tions within national communities as well as among them, perhaps 
most notably through the capitalist/communist divide (p. 78-79). Par­
ticularly restrictive in this regard was the hybrid of the nation-state, a 
fictive union that largely depended upon the myth of a cohesive citi­
zenry sharing ties of blood and memory. In the aftermath of the Cold 
War, and with the waning of the nation-state, other factions beckon 
individuals for their allegiance, emphasizing linguistic, religious, ethnic 
and racial affinities. Still, Franck confidently maintains that recent 
eruptions of ethnocultural strife - in places such as the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, or even some of the more divisive quarrels of the 
"culture wars" in the United States - are aberrant "growing pains" in 
a larger trend toward greater international cooperation, on the one 
hand, and strong individualism on the other. " [I]ndividuals are now, 
for the first time, making free, genuine choices in determining their 
own identities" (p. 40). Rigid factionalism is in retreat, and will likely 
disappear once we stop fearing our new heterogeneous global exis­
tence. In this version of a Kantian Weltburgertum, individuals will di­
vide their diverse interests among transnational groups rather than 
conform to inflexible collectivities. 
Franck discerns compelling support for his position in the un­
precedented flexibility of current citizenship. In contrast to the famil­
iar "resident alien" status, new arrangements .allow individuals to sus­
tain layered or overlapping nationalities. For example, the 
intercitoyennete of the European Union enables citizens of each state 
to acquire many privileges of citizenship in all . other member states, 
including the right to vote in local elections, or even to run for office 
(p. 64). Another indication of the weakening of the state is that it no 
longer reigns as the sole guardian of rights. Individuals may approach 
international tribunals directly. In fact, citizens can use these courts to 
wage disputes against their own governments. Franck admires the 
precedent set by the European Torture Convention in particular. The 
convention-based and other NGO forms of adjudication and moni­
toring seem promising ways to secure individual liberties without 
placing undue burdens on less affluent states, even though problems of 
access and compliance, as well as the risk of retaliation, remain. 
The foundational principle of the age of individualism is freedom 
of conscience (p. 150). Franck emphatically rejects the idea that the 
globalization of freedom of conscience is a consequence of Western 
cultural imperialism, pointing to its support by indigenous elites. Kofi 
Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, thus avers that 
viewing liberal humanism as ethno-specific (whether the charge is that 
such values are a luxury oi an imposition) is "truly demeaning of the 
yearning for human dignity that resides in every African heart" (p. 
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148). Furthermore, if the notion of freedom of conscience may be read 
into traditions of tolerance, especially toward the religious Other, the 
historical record provides sufficient evidence that non-Western socie­
ties have often accommodated dissenting views and differing practices. 
Conversely, respecting difference, religious or otherwise, has not been 
a hallmark of Western civilization, whose history of persecuting mi­
norities and dissidents is all too familiar. Questioning the conventional 
hierarchy between Western and non-Western does not, however, pre­
vent Franck from rearticulating this hierarchy in temporal terms. He 
not only presumes that vying for core rights associated with Western 
liberalism is a universal trait, but, subscribing to a teleological model, 
he also postulates that all human societies are differently located on a 
trajectory that will lead them from "communitarian uniformity" to in­
dividual self-expression. 
Market globalization and advanced technology have also expanded 
identity-making options, for instance, in terms of vocational prefer­
ences or even the possibility of physiological changes. Franck attempts 
to evaluate the level of social acceptance accorded such decisions by 
analyzing legislation and court cases (for "the social indicator is, usu­
ally, a legal one") that address three domains of personal transforma­
tion - name, sex, occupation - in addition to various aspects of pri­
vacy (e.g., sodomy, abortion) (p. 151) .  Some of the most interesting 
material in The Empowered Self emerges from the restrictions that 
many countries still impose on name alterations, maintaining that no­
menclature is a public matter crucial to the nation's stability. In 
France, for example, the government ferociously protects its control 
over name assignment and reassignment. Stringent regulations make it 
exceedingly difficult to alter one's name with a few notable exceptions 
to promote francisation, as in the case of making
· 
a "Jewish name" 
sound less foreign, "less Jewish." Even the far more flexible common 
law tradition in Britain stops short of being completely adaptable, dis­
allowing, for example, incarcerated persons the privilege of changing 
their names, since renaming would make future surveillance too diffi­
cult. In Italy, the parliament fought over and then defeated a proposal 
that would permit matrilineal assignment of surnames, a crusade led 
by none other than Benito Mussolini's granddaughter, Allesandra. 
Equally fascinating are the comparative perspectives on the legal 
status of sex reassignment, both prenatal (in most instances, abortion) 
and postnatal choice (typically transexuality). For all of the scientific 
and social advances, sex reassignment in most parts of the world is 
now increasingly permissible and yet officially closeted. Thus, in Brit­
ain, the national health system may fund the medical procedure, but 
the state will not acknowledge gender transformation in other ways. 
In recent years, international law has tended to side with the rights 
of individuals to make choices of this kind. The International Cove­
nant of Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), for instance, upholds 
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married women's prerogatives to retain their maiden names. Article 
121 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to give an­
other example, certainly helped decriminalize sex acts between con­
senting adults in various parts of the world. Franck trusts that interna­
tional bodies will go further in securing, for example, official 
recognition of sex transformation. He does not consider, however, that 
such legislation may itself be inherently deficient as a guarantor of 
freedom with respect to identity. As Kristin Bumiller and Wendy 
Brown have argued, the legal protection model may actually restrain 
or fix identity by inscribing particular and/or partial definitions.2 
Franck's writing about collectivity reveals a degree of ambivalence. 
He maintains "[t]he need for community appears as strong as ever, 
even among those who carry more than one passport" (p. 74). None­
theless, it is both his professional opinion and his political preference 
that groups will not replace the state in affixing identities to individu­
als. This segment of the book relies heavily on prescriptive argumenta­
tion. While the empowerment of the individual and the corresponding 
disempowerment of the state may have overt legal manifestations, the 
relationship between the individual and the group does not readily 
lend itself to the same sort of codification. 
For identity to be genuinely contingent, self-chosen, and multiple, 
group boundaries must be permeable. Frank proposes two additional 
principles to achieve the requisite Calderesque balance among the 
parts of the identity triad. First, he recommends allowing for local 
autonomy (including legal autonomy), especially for geographically 
insular groups (e.g., Native American tribes' exemption from civil 
suits) and for the perpetuation of some forms of cultural difference. 
Second, in the case of irreconcilable claims between groups and the 
state, he asserts that universal norms should trump particularism (pp. 
246-52) . This is akin to the primacy of the individual in the triad, since 
the individual stands for a universal principle. Unlike the other rights­
claimants, his or her rights are unacquired, natural, and therefore non­
transferable.3 
Franck, not surprisingly, supports only the integrationist strains of 
multiculturalism and suspects all claims guided by the precept of 
group survival as typically "the self-interested preferences of [the 
2. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 
(1995); KRISTIN BUMILLER, DIE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: DIE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE VICTIM (1989). 
3. P. 282. Here he relies on Kant, Williams, and Mulholland. Cf IMMANUEL KANT, 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White Beck trans., 1969); 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF (1973); Leslie Mulholland, The Innate Right 
to be a Person, in ETHICS AND BASIC RIGHTS 131 (Guy LaFrance ed., 1989). 
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group's] current power-elite."4 Still, he is careful never to slip from the 
language of integration to that of assimilation. He presents regulations 
that allow religious Jews to wear yarmulkes in the military or Sikhs to 
don turbans under their construction hats as positive models of pre­
serving markers of difference post-integration. The question remains, 
however, whether most cultural groups' rights can be similarly re­
duced to individual rights. When multiculturalism means more than 
the (literal) wearing of different hats, or the assortment of fast food 
options available at the food court in a suburban mall, accommodating 
diversity becomes far more complicated.5 
At the same time, Franck seems rather uncomfortable with the im­
plications of extreme individualism. He recruits expressions such as 
"new communitarianism," "networks of interdependence" and "com­
munities of personal autonomy" to modify what otherwise might be 
construed as a celebration of narcissism. He wants to convince the 
reader that his individualistic universe will not bring a new age of al­
ienation and anomie. Unfortunately, his model communities do not 
entirely ameliorate such apprehensions. He valorizes arbitrary and 
momentary encounters among free-floating, abstract (truly bodiless 
and accent-free) entities, borrowing Howard Reingold's discussion of 
relations in cyberspace "where I can participate in a hundred conver­
sations with people who don't care what I look like or sound like, but 
who do care how I think and communicate" (p. 91; quoting Reingold). 
A second set of problems revolves around the perils of inequality. 
For the most part, The Empowered Self minimizes the extent to which 
self-creation, or even self-designation, remains the province of elites, 
although the list of global self-imagining "individuals" includes trans­
national corporations. Franck concedes that invigorated individualism 
may entrench and deepen inequalities, "magnify[ing] the 'natural' ad­
vantage of those already favored: by social rank, family cohesion, edu­
cation and economic well-being" (p. 255). Social disparities will likely 
hinder the delicate equilibrium within his rights triad since the interna­
tional regime seems presently (and for the foreseeable future) ill 
equipped to handle inequality within and among societies, especially 
in comparison with the state, whose power over the last century was 
4. P. 250. Separatists seek cultural, social, and political autonomy, whereas integration­
ists seek protection (through antidiscrimination legislation) and, at times, assistance 
(through programs such as affirmative action). Membership in a separatist group is absolute 
and enduring, while affiliation with an integrationist group is infrequent and temporary. Pp. 
225-28. 
5. What I call the "food court multiculturalism" resembles Fish's discussion of "bou­
tique multiculturalism." See Stanley Fish, Boutique Multiculturalism, in 
MULTICULTURALISM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 69 (Arthur M. Melzer et al. �ds., 1998). 
For a discussion of the limits of the individual cultural rights paradigm, see Adeno Addis, 
Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 615 (1991). 
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much augmented by attempting to address this very predicament. 
With a few exceptions, such as the (as yet not ratified) Declaration of 
Human Responsibilities (of which he ultimately disapproves), the no­
tion of responsibility to those left behind is still not an ideal promoted 
by international bodies or jurisprudence. Moreover, Franck's version 
of liberalism cannot sustain a conception of social responsibility that 
might compel the haves to assist the have-nots. All he can propose is 
that "the recognition of a 'right of persons to be left alone' must go 
hand in hand with a universal right of persons not to be left behind" 
(p. 256) . 
The Empowered Self is so preoccupied with individual freedom of 
association that it also ignores the lingering inequities among groups. 
Franck's argument thus elides the majoritarian implications of alleg­
edly neutral or objective rights. As Will Kymlicka (among others) 
warns, minorities will always be uniquely vulnerable to nonminorities. 
Abstract, universal laws, which allocate equal rights to all individuals, 
do not resolve this imbalance.6 Furthermore, the principle of unen­
cumbered exodus may be less pertinent to the actual conditions of 
members of certain disadvantaged groups (determined by, say, race or 
gender). There is a larger issue at stake here: identities often spring 
into being through complex acts of attribution and recognition (or in­
terpellation) that cannot be explained within Franck's triadic relation­
ship.7 
Moreover, Franck conceives of the Self (i.e., the self-directing, self­
determining, autonomous self) as a natural entity that requires only 
protection from external intrusions. He does not subject the Self to the 
sort of critical scrutiny that assists him in exposing the contingent, ar­
bitrary, and fictive elements in the making of the nation-state and 
other "imagined communities."8 A substantial scholarly literature has 
undertaken the task of historicizing the Self and underscoring the rela­
tively recent social, political, and cultural forces that produced the 
ideology and practices of the "autonomous self." (Michel Foucault's 
6. Cf WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995); LESTER C. THUROW, 
THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 
(1980); Robert Paul Wolff, The Concept of Social Injustice, in FROM CONTRACT TO 
COMMUNITY: POLITICAL THEORY AT THE CROSSROADS 65 (Fred Dallmayer ed., 1978). A 
related issue Franck might have addressed in greater detail is the concern, as expressed for 
instance by critical race theorists, that legal neutrality presumes and requires assimilation. 
See, e.g. , DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE (1987); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). 
7. For just two examples beyond texts already mentioned in this Review, see JUDITH 
BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION (1997); FRANTZ FANON, 
BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam Markmann trans., 1967). 
8. Franck seems to take Benedict Anderson's thesis on nations as "imagined communi­
ties" too literally; the constructed nature of nations does not render them less stable or less 
powerful. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN 
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983). 
1416 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1409 
work, which he mentions in passing, comes to mind.) For all of the 
gestures that Franck pays to "postmodern" sensibilities by seeming, 
for instance, to rejoice in the fluidity, multiplicity, and indeterminacy 
of identity, his argument upholds a notion of a centered, ahistorical 
Self always capable of assuming control over its own making.9 This is 
not to deny the increased malleability of identity today. Were this not 
the case, "identity" would not be the focus of so much anxiety. None­
theless, the notion of self-making is a conceptual slippery slope that, 
when taken to the extreme, assumes "self-birthing" of the Horatio 
Alger school. 
One manifestation of Franck's adherence to an inflated idea of the 
Self is the ease with which he decouples the individual from society. 
His vision of "communities of personal autonomy" does not account 
for the many ways in which relations of interdependence govern inter­
actions between individuals and collectives qua collectives. Since the 
notion that individuals (identities included) are products of their cul­
ture and time has become such an article of faith in American acade­
mia (at least in the Humanities), this idea (as well as its excesses) 
needs no further explication here. It is somewhat surprising, though, 
that Franck, who makes the occasional attempt to anticipate his critics, 
either ignores this approach or, alternatively, maintains that the exter­
nal social forces that molded the individual are now receding from the 
stage of history (at least in their capacity to impose identity). The 
book thus seems to engage in an "end of history" type of argument. 
Occasionally it seems that Franck conflates identity-making with 
procedures of rendering preferences in the marketplace - hardly the 
process of "inner dialogicality" Charles Taylor so thoughtfully expli­
cates in his discussion of the rise of the modern Self .10 True, since the 
turn of the twentieth century, consumption has had a key role in con­
figuring individuals' self-understandings and self-presentations, but 
consumption does not exhaust the means and methods of producing 
such signification, nor have market decisions been bereft of collective 
cultural patterns. A market approach to identity ignores the way in 
which the medium of selection (the marketplace) itself functions as a 
differentiating mechanism that creates hierarchies regardless of the 
content of specific choices. In addition, the book minimizes the differ-
9. Numerous references to "multiple" identities aside, Franck's conception also seems 
rather one-dimensional. For a critique of this sort of "tootsie roll metaphysics," see 
ELIZABETH v. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988); Deborah King, Multiple Jeopardy, 
Multiple Consciousness, in FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACTICE & PROCESS 75 (Micheline 
Malson et al. eds., 1989). 
10. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM 25 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1994). 
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ences among various types of affiliations, the diverse circumstances 
under which they may emerge, and their disparate social functions.11 
These weaknesses in the theoretical apparatus of The Empowered 
Self do not diminish the book's importance as an exploration of a new 
internationalism. Testifying to a stronger transnational commitment to 
privilege human rights over diplomatic and other political exigencies, 
the recent struggle over the prosecution of the Chilean dictator 
General Augusto Pinochet may support Franck's argument. The 2000 
United States census furnishes another illustration of the greater flexi­
bility of self-identification, including the possibility to register multiple 
affiliations. The census suggests other lessons as well, however, for the 
choice it offers is a limited one, restricted to a few specific designa­
tions. Perhaps, counterintuitively, expanding options may actually 
have served to deepen personal investments in these classifications. 
Some allegiances, evidently, are more important than others, and 
ethno-racial categorizations seem to be as ingrained as ever. 
The book needs a more nuanced understanding of identity and a 
less conventional reiteration of Lockean liberalism. While opposed to 
"binary categorization" in other contexts, Franck divides the theoreti­
cal terrain between himself and conformist communitarians, evading 
significant portions of contemporary theory highly relevant to his 
topic.12 David Hollinger, Will Kymlicka, and other scholars who have 
recently grappled with the relationship between individuals and collec­
tives have benefited from incorporating into their analyses and pre­
scriptions insights culled from the multicultural moment.13 At times 
Franck's empowered Self appears to resemble Hollinger's "post­
ethnic," who may choose to affiliate with her "community of descent." 
But such similitude is deceptive, for unlike Hollinger's "rooted cos­
mopolitan," Franck's self-making internationalist is rootless. Hollinger 
eschews the problematic of "identity" by limiting his theorizing to "af­
filiation," for "the concept of identity . . .  can hide the extent to which 
11 .  The fact that social groups may not have essential, enduring characters does not 
make them somehow less real. For more on the contingent and relational nature of group 
identity, see, for example, WILLIAM CONNOLLY, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC 
NEGOTIATIONS OF A POLITICAL PARADOX (1991); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE 
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); IRIS MARION YOUNG, 
JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990). 
12. Many of those Franck lumps together in the communitarian camp do not rightly 
belong there. While Amitai Etzioni, Adeno Addis, Michael Sandel, and Will Kymlicka all 
argue against abstract individual rights, there are more profound differences among them 
with respect to the role they give to collectivity and the kind of collectives they seek to pro­
tect. Even with the adjectival modifier "radical," it is a bit of a stretch to classify Addis, for 
instance, as a communitarian, especially when he explicitly divides his critical ire between 
individualists and communitarians. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE (1996); 
KYMLICKA, supra note 6; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENTS (1996); 
Addis, supra note 5. 
13. DAVID HOLLINGER, POST-ETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 
(1995); KYMLICKA, supra note 6. 
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the achievement of identity is a social process by which a person be­
comes affiliated with one or more acculturating cohorts."14 Franck, in 
contrast, translates every mode of choice and allegiance into the lan­
guage of identity. Perhaps his understanding of the place of the indi­
vidual in the new world order follows too closely (and ironically so) in 
the footsteps of the old Vattelian view: autonomous, sovereign, self­
determining nation-states are replaced in his conception with autono­
mous, sovereign, self-determining individuals. While Franck does 
much to undermine the former myth (the "naturalness" of the nation­
state ), he wholeheartedly embraces the latter. 
14. HOLLINGER, supra note 13, at 6. Likewise Brodkin, in her discussion of how Jews 
came to be classified as "whites," insists on distinguishing between "ethno-racial assign­
ment" and "ethno-racial identity": the former is imposed and the latter chosen within the 
limits of this imposition. KAREN BRODKIN, How JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS: AND WHAT 
THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA 3 (1994). 
